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The Novel of American Authoritarianism 
 
CHRISTOPHER PHELPS* 
 
ABSTRACT:   Fictional literature portraying the descent of the United States into dictatorship is 
assessed critically and divided into three cultural-historical phases, each specific in class 
modality.  Ignatius Donnelly’s Caesar’s Column (1890) and Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907) 
project a plutocracy violently imposed to forestall working-class revolution.  Sinclair Lewis’s It 
Can’t Happen Here (1935) and other mid-century novels envision a demagogic American 
authoritarianism, with working-class and lower-middle-class grievances exploited to amass 
personal power.  In the Cold War and neoliberal eras, class recedes from salience in Margaret 
Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985) and Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004).  
Despite Atwood’s brilliant evocation of totalitarian patriarchy and the extraordinary interiority 
of Sherwood Anderson’s Marching Men (1917), the novels of American authoritarianism are on 
the whole characterized by aesthetic implausibility, one-sided apprehension of 
authoritarianism’s class dynamics, and failure to treat white supremacy as central. 
KEYWORDS:  authoritarianism, autocracy, totalitarianism, dictatorship, populism, demagogy, 
demagoguery 
 
                                                          
* The author expresses gratitude to Daniel Geary, Todd Landman, Rosa Hollier Phelps, Maria Ryan, Robin 
Vandome, and the Science & Society editorial collective for their comments on previous versions, and to 
Eric Bibb for permission to use his song lyrics. 
IN HIS TRACT THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT (1838), James Fenimore Cooper described three 
forms of rule:  a republic, premised on sovereignty of the people; an aristocracy, in which the 
few are the repository of power; and despotism, “a government of absolute power” in which a 
leader “governs without any legal restraint on his will.” In forging a republic, the United States 
had achieved “a distinctive principle”: “all political power is strictly a trust, granted by the 
constituent to the representative.”  Writing in the context of expanding white male suffrage 
and the workingmen’s parties of Jacksonian America, Cooper acknowledged that democracies 
are susceptible to demagoguery, appeals by “men sufficiently audacious…as to persuade a 
people to act directly against their own dignity and interests.” Yet while “the demagogue 
always puts the people before the constitution and the laws,” Cooper held, republicanism held 
the answer to its own problems, the limitation of powers reflecting “the obvious truth that the 
people have placed the constitution and the laws before themselves” (Cooper 1969, 75-76, 89, 
91, 155). 
The imagining of an authoritarian America has always manifested the cultural moment 
of its production.  Cooper embodied the nationalist self-assurance of the early republic, 
premised on dynamic market revolution, expanding slavery, and dispossession of the land of 
indigenous peoples and rival nations. That material dynamism allowed him to set aside his fear 
that authoritarian politics might undermine American democracy; the republic, whatever its 
challenges, would endure.  To be sure, anxiety over menaces posed to republicanism would 
periodically resurface, including even uneasiness about monarchical restoration, but American 
political culture’s predominant nineteenth-century confidence in its righteous republic does 
much to explain why neither the author of The Last of the Mohicans nor his literary 
contemporaries produced a fictional account depicting dictatorship in the United States. Not 
until a more vexed moment, the turn of the century, would American novelists begin to imagine 
that potentiality in full-fledged fictional form, as vast Gilded Age discrepancies of wealth and 
power, combined with periodic capitalist crises, made a despotic outcome far more 
conceivable. As the novel of American authoritarianism has unfolded since, its history supplies 
ample further illustrations that any novel of the future is also a novel of the present, a truism 
particularly evident in these novels’ ideological assumptions of class, race, and American reality. 
Class modalities, especially, have shaped literary portrayals of the American state’s 
descent into dictatorship. Three broad narrative scenarios of American authoritarian rule 
correspond to successive contexts of history, political economy, and labor-capital relations.  The 
first novels to posit an American authoritarianism, Ignatius Donnelly’s hallucinatory Caesar’s 
Column (1890) and Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907), forecast a capitalist imposition of 
autocracy from on high. Cooper’s earlier insight that demagogic populism might be the more 
likely source of American authoritarianism would be left unexplored until the era of mass 
politics and expansive state-building of the mid-twentieth century, when a second array of 
novels including Sherwood Anderson’s Marching Men (1917) and the several novels of the 
1930s and 1940s inspired by the Louisiana kingfish Huey Long, notably Sinclair Lewis’s It Can’t 
Happen Here (1935), explored the potential for a populist simulacrum of radicalism that would 
convert legitimate working-class and lower-middle-class grievances into the self-interested gain 
of opportunist politicians.  In the Cold War and neoliberal eras, with the suppression and 
retreat of labor militancy, class all but evaporates in the third phase in the novel of American 
authoritarianism, particularly in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985) and Philip 
Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004), in which a politics of gender and ethnicity is 
disembodied from social class. 
Throughout this entire tradition, alternating frameworks of national-political ideology 
have positioned authoritarianism in opposite ways.  One casts authoritarianism as un-American, 
a violation of national tradition, the work of usurpers who eviscerate the Constitution and 
thereby destroy the nation’s liberal-republican heritage. The other identifies homegrown 
American authoritarian attitudes and constituencies that indicate autocratic developments are 
the culmination, rather than the violation, of American history. Lewis and Roth epitomize the 
first approach; London, Anderson, and Atwood the second. It is tempting to describe these 
respective framings as liberal and radical, but that would be needlessly schematic and obscure 
the potential for dialectical synthesis, for it is possible to cast the relationship between 
authoritarianism and American history in a dual manner, as demonstrated with alacrity by 
bluesman Eric Bibb in his song “What’s He Gonna Say Today?” (2018): 
It’s a crazy situation 
An’ crazy ain’t nothin’ new 
But we’re talkin’ pure madness here 
A nightmare comin’ true 
 
…Mesmerised by his money 
Hypnotized by celebrity 
We’ve let a rich man’s boy climb to the top 
And hijack democracy 
 
The hybrid claim that American authoritarianism might be both “pure madness” (a tragic 
annulment of the stated democratic values that long governed the nation’s civic culture) and 
“nothing new” (an outgrowth of authoritarian instincts and practices with roots deep in 
American history) contains an important insight that has proven largely elusive in the American 
novel. 
Considerable praise has been lavished upon the novels of American authoritarianism, 
hailed in recent years for their prescience (Churchwell 2017; D’Ancona 2017; Brody 2018; Klein 
2018). This paroxysm of enthusiasm for the form is a consequence of political context, namely 
heightened anxieties about actual authoritarianism.  Authoritarianism is here defined in the 
explicit political sense of movements or intrigues that are autocratic in ambition, contemptuous 
of the liberal rule of law, and either pointing toward or achieving a maximal-leader state.  This 
phenomenon presents conceptual issues of longstanding intellectual interest (Adorno et al. 
1950) and has resurged as a focus of inquiry in the twenty-first century, both in the news media 
and social sciences (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weller 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 
2011; Cizmar et al. 2014; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Sunstein 2018).  While attention to 
authoritarianism is accelerating in the arts and humanities as well (Brown et al. 2018), that 
literature is less-developed, and this article offers the most comprehensive comparative history 
and critical examination to date of the fictional literature on American authoritarianism. 
The recent applause for the novels of American authoritarianism as a cultural resource 
of resistance obscures what an unreliable, uneven legacy they constitute.  Once the sheer 
literary feat of projecting authoritarianism as the outcome of the American political project is 
acknowledged, a close reading reveals them to more deficient than clairvoyant. Those novels 
that project a purely ruling-class or middle-class basis for authoritarianism occlude 
authoritarianism’s dynamic appeal to multiple class fractions; others ignore class altogether.  
Furthermore, the novels of American authoritarianism exhibit a white racial blindspot, being 
inattentive to racism despite the centrality of xenophobia and white supremacy in movements 
ranging from the early Ku Klux Klan to the contemporary alt-right. Finally, all too few novels of 
American authoritarianism achieve virtuosity or verisimilitude. Even those that transcend the 
stylistic crudeness that marred Donnelly’s pioneering work—caricature, hackneyed dialogue, 
bizarre plot twists—mirror his shortcomings in failing to achieve interiority into the 
authoritarian mind and in spinning implausible scenarios as to how an American authoritarian 
state might crystallize. 
A great artistic challenge, to be sure, lies in constructing vivid narratives of how a 
national polity birthed in opposition to monarchy and boastful of its libertarian-republican 
heritage could transmogrify into tyranny.  This makes the signal achievements stand out all the 
more: London’s projection of fascism years before its actualization, Anderson’s psychological 
sounding, Roth’s innovative use of innocent boy as narrator, and Lewis’s perfect title, It Can’t 
Happen Here. Yet no novel of American authoritarianism rises to the level of a masterwork on 
the order of George Orwell’s 1984 (1948).  The closest in fully realized conceptual brilliance is 
Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale—its author, a Canadian, being the sole novelist to portray an 
authoritarian United States who is not an American citizen, revealingly. 
If a society’s literary culture shows little capacity for imagining its own degeneration into 
political dictatorship, rarely doing so realistically, does that demonstrate the robustness of its 
democratic culture or its naiveté?  Whatever may be the case, American fiction has treated 
political authoritarianism implausibly, being largely one-sided in apprehension of class 
dynamics and oblivious to white supremacy. This would not be so surprising were not these 
novels so lauded.  Walter Benjamin was correct: there is no cultural document that is not also a 
record of barbarism—including, he might have added, the very documents that purport to 
condemn barbarism. 
 
Looking Forward:  The Plutocratic Future, 1890-1919 
The first novels of American authoritarianism were works of social protest and 
catastrophism that envisioned harsh plutocratic rule. Conveying some of the first proletarian 
themes in American fiction, their bleak augury was the work of those who shared in popular 
desires for a more egalitarian and democratic future but foresaw, as had Marx, that class 
struggle may end “either in a revolutionary reconstitution of the society at large, or in the 
common ruin of the contending classes” (Marx 1998, 2). Issued in a context of militant labor 
movements and ruling-class ruthlessness (Fusfeld 1980), they envisioned a class-struggle 
scenario in which radical workers straining toward power would provoke counter-revolutionary 
dictatorship, a postulation akin to Ambrose Bierce’s definition of “grapeshot”: “an argument 
which the future is preparing in answer to the demands of American socialism” (Bierce 1906, 
140). 
The earliest of these was the outlandish, bigoted, wildly popular Caesar’s Column: A 
Story of the Twentieth Century (1890).  It was the outpouring of Ignatius Donnelly, an Irish 
Catholic Minnesotan politician who began as a Republican lieutenant governor and three-term 
Congressman before deciding a struggle was on “between the few who seek to grasp all power 
and wealth, and the many who seek to preserve their rights as American citizens and freemen” 
(Hicks 1921, 88). Supporting first the People’s Anti-Monopoly Party, then the Greenback Party, 
he served as a Minnesota state assemblyman with Farmers’ Alliance support and later drafted 
the preamble of the Omaha Platform of the People’s Party, the most widely read document of 
agrarian populism. He started writing Caesar’s Column the day after Minnesota’s state 
legislators defeated his bid for a U.S. Senate seat in 1889. Its bitter radicalism led to the 
manuscript’s repeated rejection for being “extravagant and unjust toward the wealthier 
classes,” as one publisher put it (A. G. McClurg to Donnelly, December 30, 1889, Reel 90, 
Donnelly Papers).   
Donnelly’s blood-soaked nightmare was a conscious inversion of Edward Bellamy’s 
Looking Backward, 2000-1887 (1888), the quintessential utopian novel. Although Bellamy’s 
vision has been characterized as “authoritarian socialism” (Lipow 1982), Looking Backward 
intimated a democratic transition to a consensual co-operative commonwealth: “There was 
absolutely no violence. The change had been long foreseen. Public opinion had become fully 
ripe for it, and the whole mass of the people was behind it” (Bellamy 1898, 57). Donnelly, by 
contrast, foresaw civilization’s destruction. Set in New York a hundred years hence, Caesar’s 
Column posits that by 1988 the United States will be run by “the Oligarchy”: “There was a 
golden age once in America—an age of liberty; of comparatively equal distribution of wealth; of 
democratic institutions. Now we have but the shell and semblance of all that. We are a Republic 
only in name; free only in forms” (45). Political parties, judges and juries, governors and 
statehouses, Presidents and Congress: all are controlled by a small group of extremely wealthy 
men with a bearing of aristocratic hauteur. The cabal meets in a magnificent chamber. “In the 
center stood a large table,” Donnelly writes, “and around it about two score chairs, all made of 
dark tropical wood.  It was like the council chamber of some great government, with the throne 
of the king at one end.”  All power is vested in this New York financial-district conclave.  “This,” 
a guide whispers, “this is where they meet. This is the real center of government of the 
American continent; all the rest is sham and form” (62). 
In certain respects Donnelly was visionary; Caesar’s Column anticipates an air force, 
strategic bombing, chemical warfare, and even the internet (special mirrors with buttons that 
when pressed bring delivery of food or global news).  He was dutifully conventional, however, 
in his moralism and bigotry. The Oligarchy is inspired by Sodom and Gomorrah, with a 
cartoonish melodramatic villain, Prince Cabano, “the wealthiest and most vindictive man in the 
city,” at its summit (27). Corpulent, displaying “a long, thick black mustache” that could “not 
quite conceal the hard, cynical and sneering expression of his mouth,” he is lascivious, buying 
women to satisfy his sexual dissipation (117). Lack of scruples powers his success: “It is not 
Intellect that rules the world of wealth, it is Cunning” (111). Prince Cabano, we learn, is Jacob 
Isaacs, a Jew, and “the aristocracy of the world is now almost altogether of Hebrew origin.” 
Jewish financial success, according to Donnelly, was a consequence of historic persecution: 
“Now the Christian world is paying, in tears and blood, for the sufferings inflicted by their 
bigoted and ignorant ancestors upon a noble race” (32). That wistful gesture in the direction of 
tolerance does not inhibit the novel from propounding stereotypes of usurious Jewish bankers 
who make up a “money power” commanding all nations: “The world is today Semitized” (98). 
Caesar’s Column was thus shot through with the same ideological chauvinisms of anti-Semitism 
and racism that would be exploited by the actual authoritarians of the twentieth century. 
Ostensibly radical, it mirrored the ethnocentric, white-supremacist assumptions of the 
American elites of its day.1  
 Caesar’s Column predicts, but does not identify with, proletarian revolution. Its 
viewpoint, represented by Swiss-born narrator Gabriel Welstein, is that of the small producer 
pinioned between capital and labor, the reformer horrified both by plutocracy and revolution, 
the Christian seeking conciliation. An expression of the debtor West set upon by creditor East, it 
distrusts the urban-proletarian multitude cast in Orientalist terms: “The slant eyes of many, and 
their imperfect, Tartar-like features, reminded me that the laws made by the Republic, in the 
elder and better days, against the invasion of the Mongolian hordes, had long since become a 
dead letter”(38). The Oligarchy’s opposition, a clandestine Brotherhood of Destruction with 
millions of members, is led by Caesar Lomellini, whose “skin was quite dark, almost negroid,” 
whose “great arms hung down until the monstrous hands almost touched the knees,” and who 
had the “eyes of a wild beast, deep-set, sullen, and glaring” (149).  Second in command is a 
Russian Jew who absconds to Judea with the $100 million in his charge. Also belonging to the 
Brotherhood are the blacks of the South, “as barbarous and bloodthirsty as their ancestors 
were when brought from Africa” (124). In the novel’s unhinged crescendo, the vengeance-
seeking multitudes lay claim to the Oligarchy’s military airships known as Demons, blockade the 
financial district, blow the safes, pay off the airship generals, and annihilate the plutocrats. 
Looting, murder, and rapine break out, all presided over by an insane, drunken Caesar who 
                                                          
1 Caesar’s Column should not be taken as necessarily representative of the populist or radical farmer movements 
of the 1880s and 1890s, but its anti-Jewish character was well-understood by admirers who praised it for just that 
quality; see W. F. C. Wigston to Donnelly, December 21, 1890, and C. H. Roberts to Donnelly, January 1, 1891 (Reel 
95, Donnelly Papers).  For upper-class attitudes, compare Brooks Adams’s excoriation of “the rotten, unsexed, 
swindling, lying Jews represented by J. P. Morgan and the gang which have been manipulating our country for the 
last four years” (Hirschfield 1964, 375).   
directs that the carcasses be shaped into a giant putrescent pyramid at Union Square, concrete 
poured over it to make a monument. Caesar’s Column ends with the non sequitur of a utopian 
republic in Uganda, but its indelible image is of horrific carnage. 
 Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907) is a deliberate revolutionary socialist correction of 
Caesar’s Column and a significant advance upon it, if one limited by class reductionism. While 
London was notoriously prone to tropes of white superiority, The Iron Heel is almost wholly free 
of ethno-racial aspersions, as well as the puritanical motifs of sexual degeneracy and diabolical 
conspiratorialism, that made Donnelly’s Oligarchy such a caricature. The Iron Heel opens with a 
historian seven hundred years in the future presenting an annotated edition of the ancient 
Everhard Manuscript.  In its pages Avis Everhard, privileged daughter of a university professor, 
chronicles the life of her working-class husband, Ernest Everhard, between 1912 and 1932. 
Things end badly for their socialist cause then despite socialism’s eventual triumph centuries 
later, by the historian’s time. The Iron Heel is thus a novel of the disastrous near-future told 
from a remote humane future. Explaining authoritarianism as a reaction of capitalism to a rising 
militant working class, London posits the proletariat as heroic, although its class struggles are 
desperate, beset by forces brutally committed to sustaining private capital accumulation.  
Unlike the earlier stages of social progress, writes the future historian, the authoritarian 
despotism of the early twentieth century was “a step aside, or a step backward, to the social 
tyrannies that made the early world a hell” (London 1934, x). The Iron Heel’s plutocracy—again 
a capitalized Oligarchy—is not a cabal of usurers as in Donnelly, but a composite of sectoral 
interests: “the large capitalists or the trusts…composed of wealthy bankers, railway magnates, 
corporation directors, and trust magnates” (153).  This group, the “one percent” that “owns 
seventy percent of the total wealth,” dominates the Senate, Congress, courts, and state 
legislatures through a “brain” that “consists of seven small and powerful groups of men,” one 
being the controllers of the railroad companies, who work “practically in unison” (154, 158). 
The Iron Heel aims to dispel the naïve social-democratic hope that capitalism may be 
reformed gradually. The oligarch who figures most prominently in The Iron Heel is Mr. Wickson, 
a principal shareholder in the Sierra Mills, a company that troubles Avis Everhard’s middle-class 
conscience because it shunts aside a worker who lost his arm in an industrial accident, 
exemplifying capitalism’s indifference to humanity. Wickson carries himself with an 
impressively composed assurance informed by “the aristocratic ethic or the master ethic” (66).  
As Ernest Everhard speaks before the Philomath Club, an enormously wealthy Pacific Coast 
elite, Wickson sneeringly dismisses his talk with a single word: “Utopian.” Everhard’s cocky 
socialist denunciation of the Philomath men leaves most of them flustered, but Wickson coolly 
states, “We are in power. Nobody will deny it. By virtue of that power we shall remain in power.  
…We will show you what strength is.  In roar of shell and shrapnel and in whine of machine-
guns will our answer be couched. We will grind you revolutionists down under our heel, and we 
shall walk upon your faces. The world is ours, we are its lords, and ours it shall remain” (96-97). 
While London’s color-blindness is an advance over Caesar’s Column, it causes him to 
obscure the heterogeneity of the American wage-earning class.  Gone is the multi-racial, multi-
ethnic, multi-national American working class that is present, if caricatured, in Donnelly; the 
proletariat is reduced to an undifferentiated exploited mass. The portrait is in other ways 
pitiless, stripped of left romanticism. As proletariat and plutocracy struggle over the surplus, 
the regime crushes the socialist press by removing its postal privileges, defeats strikes, and 
fosters collusion of Wall Street and the United States Treasury. As the dream of a legal 
evolution toward socialism vanishes, provocateurs incite a premature bid for proletarian power 
that is suppressed in a grotesque bloodbath.  “It’s no use,” Everhard laments. “We are beaten. 
The Iron Heel is here. I had hoped for a peaceable victory at the ballot-box.  I was wrong. 
Wickson was right.  We shall be robbed of our few remaining liberties; the Iron Heel will walk 
upon our faces; nothing remains but a bloody revolution of the working class” (175).   
The distance travelled from Caesar’s Column to The Iron Heel reflects the transition of 
American radicalism from agrarian populism to socialism.  London criticizes small-proprietary 
individualism—the trust-busting restoration of competition advocated by farmers, small 
business, and professionals—as atavistic and undesirable, since large-scale production is more 
efficient and powerful. He champions the proletariat, yet without idealization, for he includes 
not only working-class revolutionaries but strikebreakers and a complicit labor caste 
represented by conservative unions. Informed by the pitched labor battles of its age, The Iron 
Heel foresees dictatorship as a mechanism to suppress radical labor by use of a formidable 
military with powers of mass conscription and the Mercenaries, a special forces. Crucially, 
London apprehends the importance to authoritarian rule of a psychology of contemptuous 
rectitude, the Oligarchy being fired by moral conviction: “They looked upon themselves as wild-
animal trainers, rulers of beasts” (299). Such an ideology, the Everhard Manuscript 
underscores, is critical:  “I cannot lay too great a stress upon this high ethical righteousness of 
the whole oligarch class. This has been the strength of the Iron Heel, and too many of the 
comrades have been slow or loath to realize it.  Many of them have ascribed the strength of the 
Iron Heel to its system of reward and punishment.  This is a mistake.  ….Prisons, banishment 
and degradation, honors and palaces and wonder-cities, are all incidental. The great driving 
force of the oligarchs is the belief that they are doing right” (300-301).   
Plutocracy is also the basis of authoritarianism in Francis Stevens’s The Heads of 
Cerberus, published serially in The Thrill Book, a pulp magazine, in 1919.  Although far less 
known than Caesar’s Column or The Iron Heel, it has a claim to distinction as the only novel of 
American authoritarianism in the fantasy genre and as the first by a woman, “Francis Stevens” 
being the nom de plume of Gertrude Bennett, an obscure secretary. Her tale concerns an 
antique glass vial filled with dust, said to be from purgatory, and capped by a silver figure of the 
mythical three-headed dog who guards the gates of the underworld. Contact with the dust 
propels the novel’s protagonists into a disorienting opiate dreamscape through which they 
arrive in Philadelphia—not their native city, but a Philadelphia two hundred years hence.  Now 
a city-state, Philadelphia is dominated by a Justice Supreme with “power absolute” and an 
Inner Order, the twelve Servants of Penn, Masters of the City (Stevens 1952, 145). History is 
erased, information controlled; commoners are called by numbers instead of names; and the 
male rulers are lecherous and assign power roles for women only on the basis of beauty or 
domestic ability. An allegory for the defeat of libertarian, democratic, and pacific ideals in the 
First World War and Red Scare, The Heads of Cerberus portrays the new social order as cynical: 
given to democratic platitudes but hierarchical, abounding in meritocratic titles but dominated 
by connections, and worshiping William Penn, the Quaker pacifist founder of Pennsylvania, 
even as it directs machine guns against the people. “Absolute despotism,” the story divulges, 
arose when the power-hungry rich used the rise of communism and class war in Europe as 
pretext for repression (154). Only by smiting the Liberty Bell, coated red to frighten and 
intimidate the populace, do the protagonists return to the present day, leaving the reader to 
wonder if a parallel time dimension or hallucination accounted for their experience.  Apart from 
its latent feminism, the Heads of Cerberus was original in use of setting, the birthplace of the 
Declaration of Independence accentuating a vitiation of American civic tradition.  
Despite its progression from the bigotry and catastrophism of Caesar’s Column to a 
higher plane in The Iron Heel and the Heads of Cerberus, the novel of plutocratic 
authoritarianism retained twin liabilities in its obliviousness to race and inability to imagine 
dictatorship coming to pass in any way except by machination at the highest echelons of 
American society.  Produced in a context of farmers’ movements and a reformist middle class, 
alive to a rising and militant labor movement, and anticipating that a revolutionary proletariat 
would supply the catalyst for a ruling-class crackdown, these novels spoke to a sharply class-
riven society but did not anticipate how important curdled middle-class dreams might be in 
stoking right-wing discontent.  The plutocratic scenario did not envision that plebeian and 
lower-middle-class strata, discombobulated and seeking order, might move sharply rightward 
and galvanize an authoritarian impetus independent of major capitalist interests, even to a 
point of providing the catalyst for authoritarian rule. 
 
It Can Happen Here: Demagogy and Dictatorship, 1917-1946  
Of the novels of plutocratic authoritarianism, only The Iron Heel would outlast the 
period of its creation, seen as prophetic (Figure 1) in the interwar years when jackbooted 
goose-steppers swept Italy and Germany.  Its conjecture of capitalist dictatorship seemed 
predictive given the consolidation of corporatist-militarist regimes seeking to restore cartel 
profitability amidst deep capitalist crisis, and as suppression destroyed labor unions and the 
left.  European developments also diverged from the story line of The Iron Heel, however. It was 
the setbacks of the revolutionary working class in 1918-1923 rather than its immediate threat 
to bourgeois society that made possible its ultimate defeat by the far right. Fascism’s initial 
class impetus, moreover, came not from the wealthiest strata but from a petit bourgeoisie 
pinned between capital and labor, resentful of national humiliation and made insecure by 
economic insecurity and hyperinflation (Trotsky 1971). “Social chaos,” as one astute journalist 
reflected, “results when in a period of intensifying class war there is no corresponding growth 
in class consciousness but in general confusion” (Stolberg 1935, 344).   
That the novel of plutocratic authoritarianism was in need of supplanting was also 
dramatized by the American context, where fears of dictatorial analogues to fascism 
concentrated upon Huey P. Long, who rose from a poor northern parish, as counties are called 
in Louisiana, to rule the state as governor and Senator between 1928 and his death in 1935, 
with clear presidential ambitions.  Whether Long “parallels the modern European dictator-
tyrant, the Hitler or Mussolini” (John Gunther) or should be understood as a “plain dictator…not 
a fascist with a philosophy of the state” (Raymond Gram Swing), his meteoric ascension 
suggested a good-ol’-boy American autocracy (Gunther 1947, 809; Swing 1935, 38). As Long 
himself drawled, “Just say I’m sui generis, and let it go at that” (Kane 1941, 140). 
No wonder that by the thirties the plutocratic novel of American authoritarianism gave 
way to literary themes of demagogy, but the first novel to explore such themes, like fascism 
itself, emerged out of the First World War.  Shaped by a piercing acumen that makes it, in 
retrospect, very far ahead of its time, Sherwood Anderson’s Marching Men was published in 
autumn 1917, a moment of coercive patriotism, imperialist bloodletting, and suppression of the 
left.  Marching Men understands militarism’s attraction while depicting authoritarianism as a 
socialism of fools. Its protagonist is Norman McGregor, a miner’s son who in childhood acquires 
the nickname Beaut, bestowed ironically on account of his “towering nose, great 
hippopotamus-like mouth, and fiery red hair” (11). Beaut flees the grim mining town of Coal 
Creek, Pennsylvania, for Chicago, where he longs for order and concocts a movement in which 
working men drill and march together in disciplined formations, military-style.  Two inapt 
interpretations have obfuscated this novel’s meaning.  One holds that Marching Men is 
“radiantly and romantically symbolic of the rise of the proletariat” (Calverton 1926).  The other 
condemns the novel for its “totalitarian bias” and “defense of political mindlessness” (Howe 
1951, 86). Each presumes Anderson’s total identification with his protagonist, an assumption 
never made in relation to Winesburg, Ohio, his celebrated short-story collection. Marching Men 
is better read as both an expression of labor’s potential social power and a forewarning that 
American workers might be led astray into a vacuous fetishism of “action.”  It achieves an 
exceptional degree of psychological insight into the authoritarian mind, motivated not by greed 
or lust, as in the plutocratic novel, so much as self-inflation to compensate for personal 
inadequacy and rancor. 
Growing up, Beaut is distinguished by “the quality of intense hatred” he holds for 
everyone else in Coal Creek (11).  He is the son of a miner, Cracked McGregor, whose head is 
never the same after a mine accident and who, though gentle with his son, is feared by his wife 
Nance before he dies rashly trying to rescue others in a mine fire. Beaut, who sees the other 
miners as drunken, ineffectual brutes, is unmoved by a socialist’s talk of a new day “when men 
would march shoulder to shoulder” in “a coming brotherhood of man” (13) Instead he admires 
the soldiers who arrive to put down a strike, “stirred by the sight of them marching shoulder to 
shoulder” (40). His mother, who starts a bakery with her dead husband’s savings, holds the 
company responsible for the rotten timbers that crushed him, so she extends credit to the 
miners’ families in a subsequent strike. Beaut, siding with the mine manager, drives them away, 
leaving his mother with only unpaid accounts. Left energized, Beaut is reminded of a “drunken 
old oculist babbling of Napoleon” he once heard brag of making money off the miners by selling 
them cheap spectacles: “He began to think that he also must be like the figure of which the 
drunkard had talked” (48).  Having come to fear Beaut as she had his father, his mother pays his 
train fare to Chicago. En route he gazes out the window dreaming: “In Chicago he meant to do 
something. Coming from a community where no man arose above a condition of silent brute 
labor he meant to step up into the light of power. Filled with hatred and contempt of mankind 
he meant that mankind should serve him.  Raised among men who were but men he meant to 
be a master” (64). 
Beaut begins to realize a Nietzschean will to power as he dominates other men, forcibly, 
in the warehouse where he works. In his rooming house Beaut reads about Caesar and other 
general-statesmen who led “thousands of men into battle” and who “appealed to him because 
in the working out of their purposes they had used human lives with the recklessness of gods” 
(129-130).  A “Napoleonic insight” comes when he returns to Coal Creek for his mother’s 
funeral. Sitting in the darkened room with her body, he hears a socialist orator on the street 
and roars out the window that humanity should be “like a great fist ready to smash and strike” 
(148, 143). As he rides with her coffin to the gravesite, the miners trudge behind in a long 
procession up the hill, honoring her for sacrificing everything for them. Oblivious to his own 
vitiation of their cause, McGregor has a vision of workers marching away their “fear and 
disorder and purposelessness,” with him at their head (150).   
Back in Chicago, McGregor enters law school where he raises his voice and fist in a 
university classroom to declare, “Why should some man not begin the organization of a new 
army? If there are men who do not understand what is meant let them be knocked down” 
(168). Pushed out of the university for this outburst, McGregor passes the bar by studying alone 
and sets up his law practice in the vice district, his big break coming when he wins a seemingly 
impossible case. A beautiful daughter of Chicago’s elite falls for his magnetism, while his 
newfound celebrity allows him to put his marching scheme into action. A bartender 
acquaintance of his who had fled military service, “a haggard cynical figure who got drunk 
whenever money came his way and who would do anything to break the monotony of 
existence,” arranges for his union of bartenders and waiters to march for Beaut with “a motley 
company of young roughs” (247-248). Beaut’s rabble denounces Chicago as “one vast gulf of 
disorder” concerned with “the passion for gain, the very spirit of the bourgeoisie gone drunk 
with desire” (156). The marching men and their song-chants terrify Chicago’s industrialists, but 
this class mélange lacks any program apart from a mood of order, mastery, masculinity, and 
force. As for labor’s ideals of justice, equality, and socialism, Beaut exhibits only contempt for 
them. He is both a miner’s son and the personification of the declassé petit bourgeoisie, a 
bargain-rate attorney whose mother failed in business. The marching movement supplies no 
more clarity for the working class than did the drunken oculist babbling about Napoleon. By the 
novel’s conclusion the marching movement is faltering, mocked by working-class doubters 
while the haute bourgeoisie sighs in relief.  Marching Men is thus neither proletarian-heroic nor 
totalitarian-admiring. Its pulsings of anger, inebriation, contempt, and violence are Anderson’s 
signposts that this is an irrational challenge to bourgeois society. This would-be American 
Bonaparte who flatters working people and disdains them mobilizes a hodgepodge of veterans 
and the lumpenproletariat in a simulacra of labor action: marching, marching, marching—
nowhere.   
The authoritarian movement in Marching Men achieves mass velocity but never 
propounds an explicit ideology, its vague opposition to the bourgeois order never fusing with 
dominant interests to achieve state power.  These limitations help explain why Sinclair Lewis’s 
It Can’t Happen Here (1935) enjoys far greater renown, despite its decidedly lesser merits. It 
Can’t Happen Here was written two years after Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power, allowing Lewis 
to mine history by combining elements of Nazism with attributes of the populism of Huey Long, 
whose assassination made the novel a publishing sensation. Richard Rorty calls It Can’t Happen 
Here “marvellously plausible,” Jonah Raskin “electrifying,” but it is difficult to share in their 
acclaim for a work so jumbled. It Can’t Happen Here was dashed off in three months, after 
which Lewis’s alcohol dependency was such that “perpetual inebriation” rendered him 
incapable of reading the proofs according to a biographer (Rorty 1998, 2; Raskin 2008; Schorer 
1961, 609). Scattershot, plodding, dotted with odd capitalizations, it has little of the cleverness 
of Main Street and Babbitt, Lewis’s bestsellers of the 1920s. Lewis himself told a radical New 
York gathering, “It isn’t a very good book—I’ve done better books” (Schorer 1961, 611). In this 
period of declension, as one critic perceptively writes, Lewis’s writing veered in “abrupt shifts 
from tough-minded realism to distressing sentimentality, radical social criticism to sympathetic 
treatment of reactionary ideas, and taut imagistic prose to strings of clichés and outdated 
rhetoric” (Lundquist 1973, 104). 
Such oscillation between penetration and incoherence is displayed in Lewis’s scrambled 
views of class.  Buzz Windrip, his surrogate Long, is weirdly distant in the narrative.  As a self-
declared populist who institutes a dictatorship, Windrip combines the plutocratic and plebeian 
strands in fictional American authoritarianism, a potential strength sorely undercut by 
contradictory class motifs, with small business, professionals, and the middle class alternately 
presented as both the well-spring of fascism and the antidote to it.  The novel’s hero is 
Doremus Jessup, the politically independent editor-owner of a small Vermont daily and heir to 
New England common sense. A local quarry owner rails against “Jew Communists and Jew 
financiers,” leaving Doremus less than persuaded when friends assure him “it can’t happen 
here” (Lewis 1935, 19).  Yet he finds it hard take the clownish Windrip seriously, finding him 
“vulgar, almost illiterate, a public liar easily detected, and in his ‘ideas’ almost idiotic” (86). He 
listens incredulously as a letter from Windrip is read on the radio explaining how he would 
make America great again: 
Summarized, the letter explained that he was all against the banks but all for the 
bankers—except the Jewish bankers, who were to be driven out of finance entirely; that 
he had thoroughly tested (but unspecified) plans to make all wages very high and the 
prices of everything produced by these same highly paid workers very low; that he was 
100 per cent for Labor, but 100 per cent against all strikes; and that he was in favor of the 
United States so arming itself, so preparing to produce its own coffee, sugar, perfumes, 
tweeds, and nickel instead of importing them, that it could defy the World…and maybe, if 
that World was so impertinent as to defy America in turn, Buzz hinted, he might have to 
take it over and run it properly (70-71). 
 
Doremus’s own son, a lawyer, defends Windrip, allowing that he is “something of a 
demagogue—he shoots off his mouth a lot about how he’ll jack up the income tax and grab the 
banks, but he won’t…. What he will do, and maybe only he can do, is to protect us from the 
murdering, thieving, lying Bolsheviks…the dirty sneaking Jew spies that pose as American 
Liberals!” (46). At a Madison Square Garden rally of Windrip’s League of Forgotten Men, 
Doremus witnesses Windrip’s cornpone charm and the hope he provides “drab, discouraged 
people”:  “He was the Common Man twenty-times-magnified by his oratory, so that while the 
other Commoners could understand his every purpose, which was exactly the same as their 
own, they saw him towering among them, and they raised hands to him in worship” (113, 88).   
 It Can’t Happen Here is the first American novel to underscore anti-Semitism and 
anticommunism as powerful elements in modern authoritarianism. A mish-mash of mendacity, 
promises, and bigotry enables Windrip to obtain mass support while serving big business.  So it 
is that fascism comes to America, the League of Forgotten Men giving way to the Minute Men 
(or M.M.s), a paramilitary club prone to “hoodlum wrath” (113).  Summary arrests, book-
burnings, detention camps, imprisonment of elected officials, executions, and a purge of 
academia ensue.  A corporate state is imposed, strikes banned. Doremus himself is arrested and 
his newspaper seized after he writes an editorial condemning the Corporatists, or Corpos, as 
President Windrip’s forces become known.  Doremus flees to Canada, blaming the responsible 
citizens whose fear and timidity allowed the dictatorship to happen.   
While It Can’t Happen Here is in many ways an advance in a literary tradition that had 
either ignored or distorted anti-Semitic and racist themes in American authoritarianism, the 
achievement is undermined as Lewis simultaneously resorts to racist stereotypes. The Corpos 
seek to bar blacks from voting or holding office, provoking bloodthirsty uprisings by “hundreds 
of Negroes, armed with knives and old pistols” and leading to “horrible instances in which 
whole Southern counties with a majority of Negro population were overrun by the blacks” (36, 
163). Thus the Corpos are deplorable for their racism and for provoking black rule.  A similar 
gallimaufry exists of gender and sexuality when the Corpos’ desire to limit women to maternal 
homemaking is presented as reactionary, but they are ridiculed as effeminate in ways 
suggesting pathological homosexuality.  Among the M.M.s is “one broad young inspector who 
was rumored to have a passionate friendship with a battalion-leader from Nashua who was fat, 
eyeglassed, and high-pitched of voice” (295).  Windrip’s organizational secretary Lee Sarason, 
who in a coup seizes power from Windrip. Sarason is said to share a “gold-and-black and 
apricot-silk bower” in Georgetown with “several handsome young M.M. officers.”  (417).  When 
deposed by the military while a New Underground fights on for democracy’s restoration, 
Sarason is wearing “violet silk pajamas” (426). Lewis was not the first leftist to paint fascism as 
gay, particularly following revelations about Ernest Röhm, but already sufficient evidence 
abounded of Nazism’s homicidal disposition toward homosexuality (“Hitler Crushes” 1934, 1-2; 
Plant 1986).  None of the recent commentaries calling It Can’t Happen Here farsighted (Harris 
2015; Lozada 2015; Stewart 2016; Nazaryan 2016; Gage 2017), remarkably, acknowledges the 
novel’s homophobia or retrograde passages on race.  An earlier critic is correct to note that It 
Can’t Happen Here is “less a tribute to Lewis’s skill in presenting a major question of the day in 
fictional terms than to his uncanny sense of what his audience would let him get away with” 
(Dooley 1967, 227). 
As literature, the subsequent novels inspired by Huey Long are worthier but 
circumscribed by moralism. Hamilton Basso’s Sun in Capricorn (1942) concerns retribution, John 
Dos Passos’s Number One (1943) hypocrisy, and Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men 
(1946) truth and history. Dos Passos’s Senator Homer T. Crawford is a Bible-quoting, folksy 
producerist—“if every man…got the full value of his production back we could all have a 
standard of livin’ like a millionaire’s”—who takes on the “slimy forces of privilege an’ monopoly 
that lurk in the night”  (Dos Passos 1943, 62, 294) but goes on benders and sets up his loyal aide 
in a backroom deal involving oil leases on state lands.  Basso’s Senator Gilgo Slade is more 
overtly dictatorial, admiring Julius Caesar, but vindictive politics and bread and circuses—down 
to a fat lady and a dwarf—are the real concern of a novel about a “man who wants to own the 
world” (Basso 1942, 219). Warren’s elegiac work is less about Senator Willie Stark than the 
conundrum of how good men do evil and immoral men good.  A product of its time and place, it 
borders on excusing demagogy. “Doesn’t it all boil down to this?” asks narrator Jack Burden. “If 
the government of this state for quite a long time back had been doing anything for the folks in 
it, would Stark have been able to get out there and bust the boys?  And would he be having to 
make so many short cuts to get something done to make up for the time lost all these years in 
not getting something done?” (Warren 1946, 133). Burden’s subsequent disenchantment, 
though real, is tempered by a lingering sense of Stark’s greatness.  In each of these novels, 
authoritarianism is muted, pushed into the background by themes of demagogy, morality, and 
corruption. 
 
The Retreat from Class in the Novel of Authoritarianism 
It is no accident that the novel of plutocratic authoritarianism (1890-1919) and the 
slightly overlapping novel of demagogic authoritarianism (1917-1946) coincided with the high 
point of mass labor insurgency in United States history. The plutocratic approach ascribed 
authoritarianism to the depredations of a financial-industrial elite confronted with working-
class redistributionist movements from below, while the demagogic approach ascribed 
authoritarianism to a lower-middle-class populism that manipulates and derails legitimate 
popular grievances better championed by the labor movement.  Before a dialectical synthesis 
could be forged and a demagogic plutocracy imagined, however, class would disappear 
altogether in the novel of American authoritarianism. That evaporation reflected labor’s 
successive historical defeats, first in the Cold War, then under neoliberalism. The result was a 
literary heritage that despite certain aesthetic triumphs was ill-equipped to speak to revived 
fears of authoritarianism amidst record inequality in the early twenty-first century. 
A first stage in this vaporization was the Cold War presumption that America was the 
linchpin of the democratic free world, which lent the prospect of American dictatorship a new 
air of implausibility and fostered its fadeout as a significant literary theme.2 The long economic 
boom’s promise that capitalism would make everyone middle class fostered a dissipation of 
class in the few remaining novels that did project an authoritarian outcome. A telling example is 
Seven Days in May (1962), a mass-market thriller by liberal journalists Fletcher Knebel and 
Charles W. Bailey II that chronicles President Jordan Lyman, whose signing of a nuclear 
disarmament treaty with the Soviet Union causes his poll ratings to plummet. A plot to 
overthrow Lyman is mounted by the triumvirate of Senator Frederick Prentice of California, 
right-wing television commentator Harold MacPherson, and General James Matoon Scott, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As ringleader, Scott creates a top-secret military unit, 
                                                          
2 A broader study of authoritarianism in literature would take up such midcentury works as Norman Mailer’s The 
Naked and the Dead (1948) or Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962), but such allegorical or 
institutional-bureaucratic authoritarianism is beyond the scope of the literal political authoritarianism under 
consideration here, as is the more diffuse or allegorical anti-fascist sentiment in an earlier generation of novels.  
ECOMCON, through which the cabal undertakes “a planned, premeditated attempt to 
overthrow the government of the United States, in violation of the Constitution” (Knebel and 
Bailey 1962, 235). As the conspiracy is laid bare, Lyman muses, “It can happen anywhere,” the 
“it” signifying “a regular damn South American junta” (71). Civilian oversight is saved by a mid-
level Pentagon functionary, Colonel Martin J. Casey, who breaks rank to tip off the President, 
leading to an Oval Office showdown in which Lyman’s fidelity to civic norms prevails as Scott 
proves insecure beneath his bluster. Patriotic honor, masculine firmness, technocratic calm: 
Seven Days in May sustains Cold War values even as it questions the arms race.  Every player in 
the novel is white and male; class is absent. Apart from one fleeting mention of California 
defense contracts, corporate interests are all but invisible in this rendition of the military-
industrial complex. The conspiracy lacks any social base. 
Social criticism of a more thoroughgoing kind could, to be sure, still be conveyed 
through the novel of American authoritarianism, as is evident in Margaret Atwood’s stunning 
Handmaid’s Tale (1985).  Since class had lost its pride of place in radical intellectual culture as 
neoliberalism from the 1970s onward saw the labor-capital compromise vitiated and the labor 
movement wither, and as other radical social movements rose to the fore, Handmaid’s Tale 
(1985) uses gender as leitmotif, to brilliant effect. It is, indeed, the only fully realized feminist 
novel of authoritarianism. The Heads of Cerberus had featured women among both its ruling 
oligarchy and challengers, and Marching Men may be read as a critique of male anger and 
violence, but neither Stevens nor Anderson treated gender systemically in the way made 
possible by the far-reaching conceptual revolution of late twentieth-century feminism.3 While 
therefore justly celebrated, The Handmaid’s Tale is slight on class and race in ways revealing its 
continuity with the very tradition of novels of American authoritarianism whose gender 
deficiencies it so decisively transcended. 
Set in a household presided over by the Commander, a silver-haired patriarch, The 
Handmaid’s Tale is told through the eyes of Offred, a woman in her thirties.  Right-wing 
Christian evangelical fundamentalism has triumphed, instituting reproductive totalitarianism. 
The household is a microcosm of the regime, for the Commander is one of the Commanders of 
the Faithful who forged a Republic of Gilead after their forces “shot the President and machine-
gunned the Congress and the army declared a state of emergency,” an overthrow justified in 
answer to Islamic militancy (Atwood 1996, 183). Gilead is labyrinthine in its natalist politics. Its 
authoritarian logic insinuates itself into daily existence far more intimately than is indicated by 
its blatant mechanisms—censoring of newspapers, outlawry of abortion and pornography, and 
requirement of passes at roadblocks—or its enforcers in the Guardian police, military Angels, 
and spying Eyes. Its most central ritual is the Ceremony, an act of coitus devised to fulfil the 
Biblical decree to be fruitful and multiply without indulging lust. In it, the Handmaid lies 
prostate between the legs of the post-menopausal Wife as the Commander carries out his 
joyless functional rutting. Offred is reduced to an incubator, the tattoo on her ankle reading, “I 
am a national resource” (75).  Even for the Commander, arousal and orgasm are almost 
superfluous, impregnation the sole aim. The stakes are high, inordinately so for Offred, for lack 
                                                          
3 While the Hunger Games trilogy by Suzanne Collins (2008-2010) celebrates defiant girl power against the 
oppressive regime of President Snow, its action-driven plots makes authoritarianism more its setting than subject.  
of fertilization within two years results either in the Handmaid being declared Unwoman and 
transferred to the Colonies or in a ride in the Birthmobile, the highest honor imaginable.    
“Traditional values” prove malleable.  The Bible is kept under lock and key, to be read 
only by the Commander in special sessions, now containing such injunctions as the sexist 
bowdlerization of Marx, “From each according to her ability; to each according to his needs” 
(127). Offred is a ward of the Commander, her very name a patronymic (“Of Fred”) that 
obliterates her independent identity.  Her thoughts often dart to a lost world before the onset 
of misogynistic puritanism when women had access to art galleries, reading, and bathing suits. 
She sustains a subversive friendship with her sardonic lesbian friend Moira even as she battles 
her feelings of resignation, drifts into memories of her mother, her past husband Luke, and 
their lost daughter in the time before Gilead, and pursues an affair with the Commander’s 
chauffeur Nick at the Wife’s suggestion, initially to secure the impregnation that the 
Commander’s seed is unable to supply, then as unbridled passion.  
The Handmaid’s Tale is exquisite in its appreciation of ambiguity, in marked contrast to 
the jejune division into heroes and villains to which the novel of authoritarianism is so 
susceptible. An array of women sustain the patriarchy: the Aunts, the Wives, and the Marthas, 
who perform roles of domestic service.  The Commander personifies Hannah Arendt’s banality 
of evil, looking like “a midwestern bank president,” yet at times Offred likes him and in the end 
he himself is victim of a purge (97). Conversely, Offred experiences discrete moments of power 
within her total context of powerlessness. The Commander invites her, without knowledge of 
the Wife, into a forbidden realm where they play Scrabble and attend a secretive bacchanal. 
There she discovers that her rebel friend Moira has become a sex worker, her will to resist 
possibly having lost out to cynicism. In all these ways The Handmaid’s Tale affords an intimate 
understanding of hegemony, the consensual underpinnings of social rule. 
Fixated on the sphere of reproduction, The Handmaid’s Tale is amorphous as to mode of 
production. Tacitly, Gilead is capitalist: the Commander is clearly wealthy and there is talk of 
trade and the Econowives of poor men. Chiefly, however, gender is class in a world where jobs, 
money, and property can only be held by men and women are relegated to domestic 
subordination. Race hardly enters into the narrative, despite—or perhaps because of—Gilead’s 
structural color-codedness (green for the Guardians, red for the Handmaids, black for the 
Commander, blue for the Wives). Allusion is made to Detroit and “the Resettlement of the 
Children of Ham” in what was once North Dakota, but African Americans never appear explicitly 
in Offred’s memories or experience (93).  Not until the mock-scholarly afterward are 
“plummeting Caucasian birth rates” evoked to explain Gilead’s preoccupation with population 
growth, or mention made that “racist fears provided some of the emotional fuel that allowed 
the Gilead takeover to succeed as well as it did” (316-317).  Race and class are ancillary in The 
Handmaid Tale, which instead focuses almost exclusively on theocratic patriarchy as Gilead 
carries out regular Salvagings, or crucifixions, of criminals upon the Wall, including same-sex 
lovers, a repatriation to Israel of Jews who will not repent, and war in the Appalachian 
Highlands against pockets of Baptist guerrillas and heretical Quakers.   
A concentration on religiously motivated bigotry is also shared by Philip Roth’s The Plot 
Against America (2004). Redolent of its twenty-first-century moment, when the “war on terror” 
reawakened liberal worries over authoritarianism, The Plot Against America departs from the 
usual futuristic novel of authoritarianism to explore a counterfactual alternative past, one set 
just before the Second World War. In keeping with his habitual mining of his own life for 
material, Roth innovatively employs as the novel’s narrator a seven-year-old, stamp-collecting 
Jewish-American boy in Newark, New Jersey, whose wide-eyed innocence affords a molecular 
perspective on the slow, disorienting erosion of democracy. The Plot Against America is dotted 
with retro allusions to the likes of PM and William Randolph Hearst, in an almost antiquarian 
touch, as if Roth were carrying off the Depression-era novel Lewis ought to have written. The 
boy’s liberal-patriotic family watches in dismay as famed aviator Charles Lindbergh heads an 
America First effort to prevent U.S. intervention in the Second World War, then wins the 1940 
Republican nomination and vanquishes Franklin Delano Roosevelt in a landslide. When 
President Lindbergh travels to Iceland to meet Hitler and signs an agreement of understanding, 
the United States becomes “party in all but name to the Axis triple alliance” (Roth 2004, 55).  
The narrator’s parents refuse to believe the new administration and Congress will 
implement fascism: “They were Republican, they were isolationist, and among them, yes, there 
were anti-Semites—as indeed there were among the southerners in FDR’s own party—but that 
was a long way from their being Nazis” (55).  This hopefulness crumbles on a family vacation to 
Washington when a tourist calls the father a “loudmouth Jew” at the Lincoln Memorial, 
followed by the family’s eviction from a hotel on the thinnest of pretexts (65). After a 
“Homestead 42” plan is announced by the Office of American Absorption to relocate Jews from 
the eastern seaboard to the hinterlands, one family friend emigrates to Canada, foreseeing an 
American Fascist New Order. “How can this be happening in America?” asks the father. “This is 
our country!”  “Not anymore,” says the mother. “It’s Lindbergh’s. It’s the goyim’s. It’s their 
country” (196, 226).  When Walter Winchell, the only national figure to oppose these 
developments, is assassinated, the devolution of “a free society into a police state” seems 
imminent (354).  
Suddenly Lindbergh vanishes and Roosevelt is restored to office.  This dissatisfyingly pat 
resolution reflects Roth’s core unwillingness to believe authoritarianism could actually take 
hold in America. For him the lost liberal consensus is the real America.  His nostalgia extends to 
class, for in The Plot Against America, class figures as a source of tension within the Jewish 
community but not in any appreciable way an explanation for authoritarianism. When a self-
seeking rabbi becomes a Lindbergh mouthpiece, his opportunism is analogous to the complicity 
of certain collaborationist Jews in Nazi Germany and Jewish neoconservatives in the Bush 
administration, a search for personal enrichment that is an affront to the humble lower middle-
class world of most Newark Jews, including the narrator’s. Race, similarly, is evaded in The Plot 
Against America, despite its adroitness in handling anti-Semitism.  “I was just trying to imagine 
what it would have been like for a Jewish family like mine, in a Jewish community like Newark, 
had something even faintly like Nazi anti-Semitism befallen us in 1940, at the end of the most 
pointedly anti-Semitic decade in world history,” Roth told an interviewer (Thurman 2017). The 
1930s were also, he might have added, years of American racial apartheid and world 
colonialism; Lindbergh was prone to racialism every bit as much as anti-Semitism. Yet The Plot 
Against America barely acknowledges white supremacy. At one point the narrator refers to a 
Kentuckian as “a long-standing member of the great overpowering majority that fought the 
Revolution and founded the nation and conquered the wilderness and subjugated the Indian 
and enslaved the Negro and emancipated the Negro and segregated the Negro…—while my 
father, of course, was only a Jew” (Roth 2004, 93-94).  What elsewhere prevails is a liberal-
essentialist conception of America as a “free society.”  To confront, say, Jewish racism or the 
experiences of African Americans in what he carelessly calls a “Jewish community like Newark” 
would have required a deeper appreciation of authoritarianism’s class and social origins.   
 
Conclusion 
Even former Presidents are now given to say that the American political system has 
changed “from a democracy to an oligarchy” (Jimmy Carter, in Sullivan and Jordan 2018).  This 
disquieting context has lent the novel of American authoritarianism prestige even though none 
of its practitioners have managed to portray an American dictatorship as percipiently as Orwell 
depicted world bureaucratic state control in 1984.4 Novels of American authoritarianism are 
wanting not merely for stylistic reasons but as a matter of ideology, in particular 
incomprehension of authoritarianism’s class dimensions and a white racial blind spot. The 
failings of the novel of American authoritarianism are thrown into sharp relief by the rise of a 
billionaire populist with a xenophobic program whose primary indicator of voter support is 
whiteness. The literary tradition’s flawed point of origin, Caesar’s Column, was a stew of 
“Shylock” and “African” stereotypes grafted onto contempt for a proletarian underclass. Its 
successors’ colorblindness is preferable but in disregarding race they miss its centrality in 
American authoritarian ideology and practice.   
Why no known novel predicting American state dictatorship has yet been produced by a 
black writer makes for an interesting problematic. It may be that the pervasive quotidian 
                                                          
4 This explains why treatments of American authoritarianism contain such curious phrases as “Orwell and Huxley’s 
America” (Giroux 2015, Section 1) and why in the aftermath of the 2016 election it was 1984, rather than any of 
the novels focused on American authoritarianism, that topped bestseller lists (De Freytas-Tamura 2017).  
authoritarianism of systematic oppression, from slavery to the present, has provided more than 
sufficient material for authors of color to explore. When a novel is at last written by a writer of 
color that imagines an American political movement leading toward state dictatorship—the 
specific authoritarian scenario under consideration here—it will be intriguing to compare it to 
prior efforts.  The absence of such voices has left the novel of American authoritarianism 
imperceptive about the white supremacy and xenophobia central to authoritarian movements 
in American history, even as it has simultaneously been hobbled by class interpretations that 
are one-dimensional or wholly lacking. 
 The twenty-first century fear of an authoritarian America arises in a context of vast 
inequalities of wealth and income combined with precarity, not unlike the Gilded Age 
origination of the novels of American authoritarianism. As fear of illiberal politics accelerates, 
so has the propensity to credit this literary ensemble with powers of divination. Prophecy, 
however, is too heavy a burden for fiction to bear.  The novels imagining American 
authoritarianism do boast extraordinary feats, especially Atwood’s gendered dystopia and 
Anderson’s peerless interiority. The former exposes the misogyny commonplace in 
authoritarian politics while the latter points to a crucial psychological contradiction in the 
authoritarian leader: “Is it really strong authority that he wishes?  In reality he demands 
rigorous order for others, and for himself disorder without responsibility” (Sartre 1965, 31). The 
literary abdication on class and race, nevertheless, has rendered the novel of American 
authoritarianism a flawed legacy, one ill-fitted for a political moment to which it might have 
spoken with far greater profundity. 
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Figure 1.  Special Daily Worker promotional cover of the 1934 Macmillan edition of Jack 
London’s Iron Heel, with charcoal artwork by “JAC,” unknown artist in the William Gropper 
style. 
Source.  Author’s collection. 
